Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of flattening progressive tax functions when markets for insurance are complete. The literature on the gains from flattening the tax code is largesome recent quantitative examples include Ventura (1999), Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (1999), Díaz-Giménez and Pijoan-Mas (2006), Conesa and Krueger (2006) , and Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2008) . All of these papers begin with the presumption that insurance markets are absent (as in Aiyagari 1994) ; progressive taxation therefore has beneficial insurance properties, as it reduces the variance of labor income. 1 It turns out that a robust prediction of these models is that aggregate activity and welfare respond positively to "flattening" the tax code. In contrast, we approach the problem from the other end of the spectrum -we ask how progressive tax reform would effect the economy in a model without any uncertainty where inequality is entirely due to immutable heterogeneity in preferences and endowments.
Constructing a model that matches the US distributions of income and wealth not based on idiosyncratic risk is difficult given the results we found in Carroll and Young (2009) . In the absence of discount factor heterogeneity, deterministic models with progressive taxation predict that the stationary distribution will have a negative correlation between income and wealth and between capital and labor income, both of which are inconsistent with US data. 2 To get around these problems, we construct distributions of discount factors, labor productivities, and labor supply disutilities that exactly match the distributions of assets, income, and labor hours in the model to those in the data. We use this model to investigate the response of the economy to changes in the progressivity of the income tax code. 3 1 Meh (2005) considers how progressive taxation affects the economy in a world with risky saving via entrepreneurial activity.
2 Elastic labor supply and/or borrowing constraints do not affect those results. 3 Saez (2002) uses a similar model in which the only heterogeneity is in initial wealth.
The qualitative and quantitative implications of tax reforms in our model are quite different than those in the incomplete market literature. We conduct three revenue-neutral tax reform experiments and find that flattening the tax code -reducing the progressivity of the income tax -tends to reduce aggregate capital and labor input, rather than increase it; the decrease is also quantitatively large. More progressive marginal tax schedules can lead to steady states with as much as 47% and 40% greater aggregate capital and labor input, respectively. The results of our other experiments, though less pronounced, consistently find that tax reforms with more progressive schedules have increase aggregate capital and labor input. We also find that increased progressivity generally decreases income inequality and increases wealth inequality. These changes occur without any change in the average tax rate in the economy, since we impose revenue neutrality on our experiments. With respect to labor input, progressivity increases labor input because it reallocates labor from less productive to more productive agents, generating output gains even though labor supply -measured by raw hours -actually declines.
Our results have two implications. First, endogenizing the extent to which the private sector can provide insurance -as in Krueger and Perri (2005) orÁbrahám and Carceles-Poveda (2007) -may be critical for understanding whether progressive taxation increases or decreases aggregate activity. Second, the extent to which inequality is driven by preferences vs. endowments also will play a role in determining the effects of progressive taxation, as they do in determining the effects of eliminating the business cycle (see Krusell et al. 2009 ).
Model
The model economy is composed of three sectors: a stand-in firm, a government, and a collection of heterogeneous households.
Households
The economy is populated by an infinite set I of households of unit measure. These households differ ex ante along three dimensions: their discount factor β, their permanent labor productivity ε, and their disutility from labor B. Every household is endowed with 1 unit of discretionary time which it may allocate to leisure, ℓ, or labor, h. Any household i ∈ I has preferences over consumption, c, and leisure which are described by the following lifetime utility function:
σ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of leisure and is assumed uniform across households. 4 While we do not focus on sustained growth, the utility function is consistent with a balanced-growth path along which leisure and labor supply are constant.
Firm
Each period, a stand-in firm uses capital and labor input to produce output according to a production technology F (K, N ). Let F (K, N ) be strictly concave and increasing in K and N and
Output may be consumed or invested toward future capital. The firm rents inputs from the households through perfectly competitive markets. Letting the production technology be Cobb-Douglas with capital share parameter α ∈ [0, 1], profit-maximization implies that each input is paid its marginal product so
Government
Each period, the government collects revenue from a tax on income, τ (y) and purchases G t goods which do not enter the households' utility functions. Let τ ′ (y) : R + → [0, 1) be continuous and monotone increasing. Let Γ (i) be the density of agents over types i. Any surplus revenue is rebated back to the households via a lump-sum transfer, T t , so that the government's budget constraint,
is satisfied each period. We abstract from the presence of government debt.
Equilibrium
Each household i maximizes (2.1) by choice of consumption, leisure, and savings, k i,t+1 , while respecting its budget and time constraint
where
is household income. Given the behavior of the firm and the government and a population density Γ (i), an equilibrium can be defined as a set of household decisions
, and government policies {G t , T t } ∞ t=0 such that for any t ∈ {0, 1, ...}
For every
2. {w t , r t } clear the labor and capital markets:
3. The goods markets clear:
4. At {G t , T t } the government's budget is balanced.
The household's optimization problem has a continuous, concave objective function and a compact and convex constraint set. Along with (2.3) and a transversality condition for each i ∈ I, the following system of equations describes an equilibrium:
if h it > 0 then the second condition is an equality.
Steady State
Equations (2.6), (2.7), (2.3), and (2.5) simplify in the steady state to
For a given rental rate, (2.8) pins down the long-run marginal tax rate for each household. Since τ ′ (y) is strictly increasing, each marginal tax rate is associated with a unique level of income, and (2.8) identifies the long-run distribution of income. Given τ ′ (y), household i's long-run income is a function only of β i and r:
Note the following properties of θ: Because for a given tax function and transfer, a household's steady state consumption depends only upon its income, the hours supplied by a household can be expressed as a function of its preferences and market prices:
Hours have not been expressed as a function of the wage because equilibrium w can be written as a function of r and α under the assumptions about F . Note that what matters for hours is not productivity per se, but rather productivity relative to the disutility parameter.
Finally, the long run wealth of each household is also determined by preferences and prices through (2.11), so
The level of productivity plays a role in determining the asset holdings of each household.
The role of household characteristics on steady state income, wealth, and hours
Holding market prices and government policy fixed, we now examine how long run income, wealth and hours are affected by β i , ε i , and B i .
• The Discount Factor: Given market prices, β i identifies long run income y i . Larger β implies larger y. Turning to hours and wealth,
More patient households will save more and work less, all other things equal.
• Labor Productivity: In the steady state, income is independent of ε, and therefore so is consumption. For hours and wealth,
so hours rise with ε and wealth declines.
• Disutility of Labor: As one would expect, increases in B decrease steady state hours and increase steady state wealth.
• Frisch Elasticity: The parameter σ (the reciprocal of the Frisch elasticity) only affects the sensitivity of the responses of hours and wealth, not the direction. As σ → ∞, h * → 1, so that hours and wealth are unresponsive to changes in either parameters or prices.
The response of steady state income, wealth, and hours to changes in prices and fiscal policy
To better understand our numerical results, it is helpful to do some partial equilibrium comparative statics on the steady state.
• Increase in τ (y i ) (or a decrease in T ):
Holding prices fixed, an increase in τ (y i ) (or a decline in T ) does not affect long run income;
A i falls. Hours weakly rise for each household not at the lower bound on hours after the A i decrease. 5 Wealth moves in the opposite direction as hours so it weakly falls.
• Increase in τ ′ (y i ):
5 For these households, the multiplier on the hours constraint is less binding after the tax change.
If the marginal tax rate rises, then according to (2.8) y i falls. For households with discount factors not less than 1 1+r−δ , hours weakly rise in response to an increase in the marginal tax rate.
where the second equality is true because
by (2.12). Less patient households will already be converging to the natural borrowing limit where hours approach 1. Decreasing the return to savings by increasing their marginal tax rate will not induce them to reverse their behavior. Therefore as long as β is sufficiently large, steady state wealth decreases with τ ′ . 6
• Increase in r (decrease in w): An increase in the steady state rental rate (or equivalently a decline in the aggregate wage) leads to a rise in income for every household. The size of this increase for any given household will depend upon what part of the marginal tax function the household faces. In order for (2.8) to be satisfied, for any household i the after-tax return on savings in the new steady state must be equal to what it was in the initial steady state.
Therefore an r increase must be offset by an increase in τ ′ (y i ) (i.e., y i must increase). If a 6 In our experiments no household has a β less than
particular household is in a region of the marginal tax function where its derivative is near zero (near the upper bound), then a large increase in y i will be necessary to satisfy (2.8). On the other hand if the derivative is large, then only a small increase in y i will restore equality in (2.8). Therefore, an increase in r will tend to increase income inequality. In addition, the long run response of hours is negative and therefore that of wealth is positive.
Numerical Experiments
In order to find quantitative results for the model, we conduct a series of revenue neutral tax experiments. We select the following functional form for each household's tax bill:
The first term is the functional form Gouveia and Strauss (1994) assumed to estimate the effective personal income tax function using 1989 US tax return data. 7 The second term, ν 3 y, captures other tax revenues that are not modeled but are paid by households in the data (e.g., excise taxes, estate taxes, property taxes). In the interest of focusing on the progressivity of the personal income tax, the combined effect of these other taxes is assumed to be a linear function of income. ν 0 sets the upper bound on the marginal personal income tax rate. The highest possible value of τ ′ (y) then is ν 0 + ν 3 . ν 1 changes the curvature of the function. The exact way in which it does so will be clear after the first experiment. Finally ν 2 adjusts τ (y) for the unit of measure of income.
Throughout all experiments its value remains fixed. It is important to remember that because of revenue neutrality, the average tax rate is unchanged across experiments. The wide range of 7 This functional form has been used in a number of quantitative studies of progressive taxation, including Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (1999), Conesa and Krueger (2006) , and Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2008) . An alternative smooth specification is used in Sarte (1997) , Li and Sarte (2003) , and Carroll (2009), while a more detailed nonsmooth function is used in Ventura (1999).
steady state distributions and of their corresponding moments strongly suggests that ignoring the distributional effects of tax changes may not be innocuous.
Calibration
To initialize the model, we calibrate to income, wealth, hours, and analysis weight data from the Survey of Consumer Finances 1992 Finances , 1995 Finances , 1998 Finances , 2001 , and 2004. The total number of households used for the experiment is 15, 437. After deflating these data by the 1992 GDP deflator, we normalize aggregate income to 1, wealth to 3, and hours to 0.33. We set α = 0.36 and σ = 2.
Government spending is 20 percent of aggregate income and transfers are 10 percent. We also fix ν 0 and ν 1 to 0.258 and 0.768 from Gouveia and Strauss (1994) . We set the remaining parameters so that the steady state of our model matches specific aggregate statistics at the annual frequency. ν 3 = 0.0855 which implies that 71.5% of tax revenue is raised through the progressive personal income tax. 8 Depreciation is set to δ = 0.05 so that investment is 15 percent of income. ψ i for each household is set to the household's population weight in the SCF. We then normalize these weights so that ψ i = 1. In addition, we construct the cdf of B. Then if we encounter a non-working household, we use its reported age, education, and race along with the regression equation to get a predicted ε i . Given ε i , we find B i,min for which the intratemporal condition just binds. To select a B i we draw from the cdf of B truncated below at B i,min . Finally, r and ν 2 are adjusted to clear the market for capital goods and the government budget constraint.
A note on the measurement of tax progressivity
We now discuss the notion of progressivity. It is not clear exactly how to characterize a tax change as "progressive" or "regressive" when the underlying distribution of income changes. As a result, it is not straightforward to compare the progressiveness of two tax functions and so there are several methods used in the literature, and these measures may not agree on the ranking of tax schedules. We choose to report the Kakwani (1977) index which is the tax Gini coefficient minus the income Gini coefficient. A higher value of the index corresponds to greater progressivity.
This index is particularly well-suited to our problem because the income distribution is not fixed in our experiments. To see this, suppose two tax functions, τ A and τ B , are associated with two different steady state income distributions Γ A and Γ B , and without loss of generality assume that
where G τ i is the Gini coefficient of the tax burden in the steady state resulting from τ i . In words, the tax burden in steady state A is more unequal than it is in B. Now there are two possible reasons for why this may be the case. First, τ A may simply place higher average tax rates on high income households than τ B . Alternatively, Γ A may have a greater fraction of high income households than Γ B so that most of the tax burden rests with these high income households (even if their average rate is lower than under τ B ). The Kakwani index corrects for these differences in income inequality.
In Tables 2, 4 , and 6, we report the Gini coefficients of income and of wealth as well as two Kakwani index calculations. Because it is not certain that a tax change which seems more pro-gressive initially will end up being more progressive in resulting steady state, we give two Kakwani index measures. Kak pre measures the Kakwani index of the tax change using the initial income distribution, while Kak post measures the index on the long run distribution of income. In our experiments, the direction of progressivity never reverses (i.e., the ordering of tax reforms according to progressivity resulting from Kak pre is preserved under Kak post ). Nevertheless, in most cases the degree of progressivity is significantly diminished in the long run as households respond to the new tax code. Kak post > Kak pre in only the final experiment, and this occurs because the Gini coefficient of the tax burden hits its upper bound of 1 while income inequality increases in the new steady state.
Experiment 1: Increase in the Curvature of the Personal Income Tax
In this experiment we increase the value of v 1 and adjust ν 3 to balance the government budget constraint. v 1 alters the degree of progressivity of the tax function: when v 1 = 0 the personal income tax is flat, but when ν 1 > 0, average tax rates and marginal tax rates rise with income. Figure 1 displays the marginal personal income tax function for several ν 1 values in the range explored in the experiment. A higher ν 1 reduces the marginal tax rate on low incomes and induces a more rapid rise to the highest rate, ν 0 . 9 This figure, however, does not account for revenue neutrality's effect on the total tax bill. Figure 2 shows the marginal tax bill function which reflects the changes both in ν 1 and ν 3 . When revenue neutrality is imposed it is not immediately clear which tax is more progressive. A ν 1 of 0.768 places a higher total marginal tax rate on low income than greater ν 1 values do. Compared to a value of 2.0, ν 1 = 3.0 leads to higher marginal tax rates on high income households as one would expect, but it also imposes higher rates on the very poor.
Turning to the effects of tax policy changes on the long-run levels of aggregate variables. We 9 In the limit as ν1 → ∞, the marginal tax function approaches a flat tax with an exemption at low income levels.
See Conesa and Krueger (2006).
report the percentage changes in the aggregates in Table 1 . ν 1 has a hump-shaped relationship with income, capital, labor input, and wages. Figure 3 plots the steady state levels of aggregate income, capital and consumption over ν 1 . All three exhibit dramatic responses to changes in ν 1 .
For example, increasing ν 1 from 0.768 to 2.0 causes aggregate wealth to increase by 46.8 percent.
Even at the highest value of ν 1 , capital is still 43 percent above the baseline level. Responses in the labor market are plotted in Figure 4 To make this more pronounced, we plot the average labor input within each percentile of ε. This is shown in Figures 7 and 8 . Now the difference at the upper tail is starkly apparent, especially in the top 1 percent.
One advantage of the modeling technique used here is the ability to characterize behavior at the extremes of the income and wealth distributions. Figures 9 and 10 show the breakdown in income, wealth and consumption across the steady state distribution for some values of ν 1 . There are several conclusions that can be made about ν 1 increases. First, increasing ν 1 reduces income inequality. The Gini coefficient of income is cut by more than 50 percent when ν 1 increases from its baseline to 3.0. In general this is caused because low and middle-income households marginal total tax rates are reduced the most. Nevertheless, not all high income households reduce their income. Finally, the interest rate is lower in the ν 1 = 3.0 steady state. As discussed previously, this leads to lower income inequality. Wealth inequality, on the other hand, increases. Plots of the income, wealth, and tax burden Gini coefficients across steady states is shown in Figure 11 .
Experiment 2: Shift between Personal Income Taxation and other Tax Sources
This experiment increases the fraction of tax revenue raised with the progressive income tax relative to the flat tax by increasing ν 0 and reducing ν 3 . Figures 12 and 13 compare the baseline marginal personal income tax functions and marginal tax bill functions for several values of ν 0 in the experiment. 10 As ν 0 increases the marginal personal tax function rotates upward, however the marginal total tax function rotates downward which is consistent with our finding from the previous experiment that higher progressivity is associated with more aggregate activity. In fact, in the steady state where ν 3 = 0, aggregate income is 11.6 percent larger and the capital stock is 14.5 percent larger than in the baseline case. Percent changes for all aggregates are displayed in Table 3 . In figures 14 and 15, the steady state values of the economy's aggregates are plotted for the whole range of ν 0 in the experiment. There is basically a linear relationship between ν 0 and the aggregate variables. As in experiment 1 (though to a lesser degree), average hours falls and total labor input rises so once again more progressivity is effecting a substitution from less productive workers to more productive workers.
The qualitative results for inequality are also similar to those from experiment 1. Figure 16 plots the steady state Gini coefficients of income, wealth, and taxes. The income Gini falls slightly as the total tax schedule tilts towards the progressive income tax schedule. In contrast, wealth inequality rises significantly (roughly 16%). In this case, the large increase in wealth inequality comes primarily from large negative asset positions taken by moderately patient households with very high labor productivity.
Experiment 3: Flat Tax with an Exemption
In our final experiment, we consider a tax function like that from Conesa and Krueger (2006) who find that the optimal progressive income tax combines a flat tax with an exemption level for income.
In our case, this is approximated by letting ν 1 → ∞. In keeping with that paper we eliminate the linear schedule (i.e., ν 3 = 0) and adjust ν 0 to balance the government's budget. There are two marginal tax rates under this system -one is zero and the other is τ = ν 0 , with a level of income y = 1 that determines the switch. 11 Incomes aboveȳ pay a tax billτ * ȳ, while incomes belowȳ pay nothing. 
Further, any type with discount factor β 1 has income y 1 > 1. Types with discount factors less than β 2 have income equal to −T . Any type with β = β 2 will have y 2 ≤ 1.
Proof A necessary condition for a steady state is that
The parameter τ simply equals ν0, andȳ will always equal 1.
16
First, from the household's budget constraint any type n with assets approaching the borrowing limit must steady state income approaching −T . Thus if y n > −T ,
Second, since government expenditures are positive by budget balance τ y (y) =τ for at least one type, implying that there are households with income greater than 1 in the steady state. The steady state Euler equation for any such household is
Given an r and aτ , this condition can only be satisfied for one β n . It is easy to see that this β n = β 1 . If it were satisfied for some other β n , then
which violates (3.1). Therefore
Note that (3.1) is satisfied for n > 1 when
To complete the proof, we will now show that a steady state cannot exist for β n ≥
Assume not. Then there must exist a β s such that
, 0 < η < 1.
Either
which is a contradiction becauseτ > 0. Therefore y s > 1, and
which is also a contraction. Therefore y s does not exist implying that there can be no β s in a steady state.
Define an intermediate β type as any type n for which
As shown above, the existence of an intermediate β type rules out a steady state. To see this, note that y = 1 is the the only potential steady state income value for any intermediate β type. At y = 1, however, consumption growth must be positve because this type discounts the future less than the market pays for deferred consumption (i.e., β n > In the steady state of our numerical experiment, τ = 14.5 percent. Table 5 
Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the consequences of altering the progressivity of the tax code in a model with heterogenous household but no idiosyncratic risk. As we noted in the Introduction, our results are qualitatively different from those found in models with incomplete asset markets.
Thus, we argue that more attention must be paid to deriving the insurance opportunities available to households, either in terms of borrowing limits or missing insurance markets. Some papers take steps in this direction, such as Krueger and Perri (2005) orÁbrahám and Carceles-Poveda (2007), but more work is needed. Table 7 illustrates how assumptions about the nature of income and wealth inequality lead to different predictions about the effects of flattening the tax code.
We want to point out "progressive" tax reforms -that is, changes in the tax function that induce more progressivity relative to the estimated U.S. tax function -would enjoy strong political support. Carroll (2009) contains an investigation of the source for this support; it would be of considerable interest to investigate this issue in the models that endogenize risk sharing. Table 3 Experiment 2: % Change Table 5 Experiment 3: % Change
.2 265.6 254.0 10.6 184.5 Table 6 Exper 3: Inequality and Progressivity 
